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INTRODUCTION 
Construing patent claims has been a daunting task for judges, 
litigators, and competitors because of the ideological split between 
Federal Circuit judges.  Some Federal Circuit judges follow a 
“specification-based approach” by relying on the written 
description and the prosecution history to limit the scope of the 
claims to what was disclosed.  Other Federal Circuit judges follow 
a “claim-based approach” by referring to dictionaries to determine 
the ordinary meaning of a disputed claim term.  This continuing 
debate has prompted the Federal Circuit to grant a petition to 
rehear en banc the case of Phillips v. AWH Corp.1 
To appreciate the consequences of this decision, this Note 
explores the advantages and disadvantages of the claim-based and 
specification-based approaches.  The Note emphasizes that courts 
should not get distracted with determining a concretized meaning 
of disputed claim words using dictionaries alone.  “A word is not a 
crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought 
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the 
circumstances and the time in which it is used.”2  Relying on 
dictionaries alone encourages superficial claim construction with 
 
 1 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted, 376 
F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 2 Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of Language, 
and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 532 (2004) (quoting Towne v. 
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)). 
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inadequate technical understanding of the invention.  By reviewing 
the specification and the prosecution history with an eye to a 
person skilled in the pertinent art, only then can a judge ascertain 
the proper meaning of a claim term.3  But the question still lingers, 
even past the Phillips en banc decision, on what constitutes an 
improper narrowing of a claim caused by importing a limitation 
from the specification into the claim, and what constitutes a proper 
reading of a claim in light of the specification. 
Part I of this Note presents the analytical framework of the 
specification-based and claim-based approaches.4  It examines the 
methods by which one can overcome the “heavy presumption” that 
a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.  Part I 
also points out that the Federal Circuit, in employing the claim-
based approach, refused to narrow multiple dictionary definitions 
based on a rising threshold, referred to in this Note as the 
Suggestion Test.5  Part II explores the role of extrinsic evidence in 
claim construction6 and Part III evaluates the Federal Circuit’s 
controversial commingling of claim validity analysis with claim 
construction.7  Finally, Part IV demonstrates how the two 
approaches to claim construction conflict in Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., and presents the eagerly anticipated en banc decision that 
provided little guidance to the patent community.8 
I. IDEOLOGY OF THE TWO APPROACHES TO  
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
Since the inception of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the 
underlying principles of claim construction have changed.  In the 
past, the Federal Circuit applied the “specification-based 
approach” by relying on the context of a claim term used in the 
written description and the prosecution history to determine its 
 
 3 See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“the patent disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and 
toward the proper meaning.”). 
 4 See infra notes 9–219 and accompanying text 
 5 See infra notes 158–86 and accompanying text 
 6 See infra notes 220–41 and accompanying text 
 7 See infra notes 242–58 and accompanying text 
 8 See infra notes 259–345 and accompanying text 
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meaning.9  However, today, some Federal Circuit judges prefer 
dictionaries as the primary source for determining the ordinary 
meaning of the claims.10  This disparity is due to the application of 
the twin canons of claim construction: (1) “one may not read a 
limitation into a claim from the written description”, but (2) “one 
may look to the written description to define a term already in a 
claim limitation, for a claim must be read in view of the 
specification which it is a part.”11 
These canons provide competing principles in claim 
construction.  While the first canon prohibits importing a limitation 
from the specification into the claims, the second canon permits 
defining a claim term based on what is disclosed in the 
specification, which inevitably leads to importing the definition 
from the specification into the claims.12  The Federal Circuit 
recognized that “there is sometimes a fine line between reading a 
claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the 
claim from the specification.”13  However, the court did not 
explain to what extent its reading “in view of” the written 
description constitutes importing a limitation into the claim. 
Typically, proponents of the specification-based approach 
characterize their narrow interpretation of claims as being “read in 
light of the specification.”14  They justify their claim construction 
by suggesting that “[c]laims are not interpreted in a vacuum, but 
are part of . . . the specification.” 15  Conversely, proponents of the 
claim-based approach interpret the claims broadly so that 
 
 9 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976–88 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc). 
 10 Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 11 Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 12 See id. 
 13 Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 14 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc 
granted, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 15 Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116 
(Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
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limitations “are not to be read into the claim.”16  They emphasize 
that “while . . .claims are to be interpreted in light of the 
specification and with a view to ascertaining the invention, it does 
not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into 
the claims.”17  These diverging views in applying the twin canons 
of claim construction have been the subject of debate for many 
years. 
A. Context As Primary Source Of Claim Construction 
One of the early cases that applied the specification-based 
approach was the Markman en banc decision.18  The patent was 
directed to a dry-cleaning inventory-control system for tracking the 
progress of clothing items.19  At issue was the meaning of the 
claim term “inventory.”20  The patentee argued that inventory 
meant articles of clothing or dollars, while the accused infringer 
alleged that the claim term referred only to clothing.21 
To determine the meaning of the disputed claim term, the 
Federal Circuit considered three sources: the claims, the 
specification, and the prosecution history.22  The court emphasized 
that “[c]laims must be read in view of the specification, of which 
they are a part.” 23  Further, the court explained that the written 
 
 16 Comark, 156 F.3d at 1186 (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 17 Id (quoting Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 18 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976–88 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc).  Aside from applying the specification-based approach, the Federal Circuit 
addressed whether claim interpretation is an issue of law or fact, which was ultimately 
resolved by the Supreme Court. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 
370, 388–89 (1996) (suggesting that claim construction is a “special occupation” that 
requires “special training and practice,” and that judges are “more likely to be right, in 
performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.”).  For the sake of 
“uniformity,” the Supreme Court allocated all issues of claim construction to the court. 
Id. at 390.  See also Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1446, 1454–57 (Fed Cir. 
1998) (en banc) (confirming that claim construction is a matter of law, that the Federal 
Circuit reviews de novo on appeal). 
 19 Markman (en banc), 52 F.3d at 971. 
 20 Id. at 973. 
 21 Id. at 974–75. 
 22 Id. at 979–80.  Collectively, these three sources (the claims, the specification, and the 
prosecution history) are referred to as the intrinsic record. 
 23 Id at 979. 
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description “may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the 
invention and may define terms used in the claims,”24 and that the 
prosecution history should also be considered if it is in evidence.25 
In addition to the intrinsic record, the Federal Circuit noted that 
extrinsic evidence can “be used for the court’s understanding of the 
patent, [and] not for the purpose of varying or contradicting the 
terms of the claims.”26 It “may be helpful to explain scientific 
principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that 
appear in the patent and prosecution history.”27  The court 
identified extrinsic evidence as “all evidence external to the patent 
and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, 
dictionaries, and learned treatises.”28 
Applying its analytical framework to the facts of the case, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the disputed claim term “inventory” 
refers to articles of clothing.29  While the disputed claim term 
could mean cash or money, the court focused on the context in 
which the term was used in the claim, the specification, and the 
prosecution history.30  The court noted that the specification “is 
pervasive in using the term ‘inventory’ to consist of ‘articles of 
clothing’” and that the prosecution history supported its claim 
construction.31 
In another Federal Circuit opinion, the court applied the 
specification-based approach to construe the disputed claim term.32  
The patent was directed to balloon dilation catheters used in 
coronary angioplasty procedures for removing restrictions in the 
coronary arteries.33  The patentee argued that the disputed claim 
 
 24 Id at 980 (“The caveat is that any special definition given to a word must be clearly 
defined in the specification.”). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 981. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 980.  Note that dictionaries were considered extrinsic evidence, and 
accordingly, may not vary or contradict the terms of the claims. 
 29 Id. at 982–83. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 982. 
 32 Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
 33 Id. at 1339. 
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term, “lumen,” included two types of catheter configurations: a 
dual lumen configuration and a coaxial lumen configuration.34  The 
accused infringer argued that the specification limited the scope of 
the claim term to coaxial lumen catheters.35 
Relying on the specification, the Scimed court determined that 
the patentee disclaimed the dual lumen configuration.36  Although 
the patentee suggested that the lower court had committed “one of 
the cardinal sins of patent law—reading a limitation from the 
written description into the claims,” the Federal Circuit disagreed 
and noted that the claims were properly “read in view of the 
specification, of which they are a part.”37  The court emphasized 
that: 
Where the specification makes clear that the invention does 
not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be 
outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though 
the language of the claims, read without reference to the 
specification, might be considered broad enough to 
encompass the feature in question.38 
Turning to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit noted that 
the patentee overcame prior art by describing advantages of the 
invention’s coaxial lumen configuration over the prior art dual 
lumen catheters.39  Furthermore, the patentee described in the 
 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 1340.  Like Markman, the Scimed court spent virtually no time analyzing the 
language of the claims, and instead, defined the scope of the claims by way of the written 
description itself. See John Josef Molenda, Understanding The Federal Circuit’s Internal 
Debate and Its Decision to Rehear Phillips v. AWH Corp. En Banc, 86 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 911, 919–20 (2004). 
 37 Id. at 1340–41  (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976–88 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)); see Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 
1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Claims are not interpreted in a vacuum, but are part of and 
are read in light of the specification).  See also Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris 
Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that “there is a fine line between 
reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from 
the specification.”). 
 38 Id. at 1341. 
 39 Id. at 1342–43.  But see Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the written description did not suggest that the invention 
must always be used in a manner that achieves the advantage recited).  The Northrop 
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written description that the coaxial lumen configuration was “the 
basic sleeve structure for all embodiments of the present invention 
contemplated and disclosed herein.”40  Because the patentee 
identified, criticized, and disclaimed the dual lumen configuration, 
the scope of the disputed claim term was limited to the coaxial 
lumen configuration.41 
Both Markman and Scimed illustrate that reliance on the 
specification was necessary in determining the meaning of the 
disputed claims.  If the context by which the term was used in the 
claim, specification, and prosecution history was not taken into 
consideration, a different outcome would likely have occurred.  
Relying on the context for construing claims allows judges and the 
public to understand what the patentee’s invention is.  It is the 
patentee’s expression of these terms in the intrinsic record that 
shed light as to what the patentee meant in his claims.  However, 
as explained earlier, relying on the specification may run afoul of 
the claim construction canon against reading limitations from the 
written description into the claims. 
B. Defining Claims In The Specification By Implication 
In Vitronics, the Federal Circuit expanded on Markman’s 
analytical framework to claim construction.42  In doing so, the 
court established a hierarchy of evidence that can be used to 
construe claims.43  The court required that intrinsic evidence of 
record, i.e., the claims, the specification, and the prosecution 
history, should be consulted before relying on extrinsic evidence.44  
 
case, discussed infra notes 180–86 and accompanying text, is one example that shows 
how the specification-based approach as applied in Scimed is different from the claim-
based approach. 
 40 Id. at 1343.  Therefore, if a patentee stated in the specification that all embodiments 
contain a specific feature of the invention, the claim will be limited to that feature; 
however, if the patentee did not make such a statement, that feature of the invention 
contained in all the embodiments disclosed will not be read as a limitation into the 
claims. See Comark, 156 F.3d at 1187 (suggesting that “particular embodiments and 
examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.”). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 43 Id. at 1582 . 
 44 Id. 
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“Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the 
legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.”45 
First, the court looked at the “ordinary and customary 
meaning” of the claim language itself to define the scope of the 
patented invention.46  Second, the court reviewed the specification 
“to determine whether the inventor has used the claim terms 
inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.”47  The Vitronics court 
emphasized that the “specification acts as a dictionary when it 
expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms 
by implication.”48  The specification is “the single best guide to the 
meaning of the disputed term.”49  Third, the court analyzed the 
prosecution history of the patent because often it is of “critical 
significance in determining the meaning of the claims.”50 
Next, the court indicated that it is improper to rely on extrinsic 
evidence when an analysis of the intrinsic record alone resolves 
any ambiguities in a disputed claim term.51  Extrinsic evidence 
“may be used only to help the court come to the proper 
understanding of the claims,” but cannot be used to “vary or 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.  The Vitronics court noted that “[a]lthough words in a claim are generally given 
their ordinary and customary meaning, a patentee may choose to be his own 
lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the 
special definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification.” Id.  This case 
was among the first to highlight the concept of a claim term’s “ordinary meaning,” that 
may be altered by the specification explicitly or implicitly. See Michael S. Conner & 
John A Wasleff, Where Do We Go from Here? A Critical Examination of Existing Claim 
Construction Doctrine, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 878, 882–83 (2004). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976–88 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc)).  This case marked the evolution of defining a claim term “by 
implication.”  The court did not explain how one can interpret or define a claim term “by 
implication.”  Consequently, this decision gives little guidance for competitors, 
practitioners and district courts on how to use the specification to define or interpret a 
claim. 
 49 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id.  The Federal Circuit was concerned that the public notice function of the patent 
would be rendered meaningless if it could be altered by extrinsic evidence.  While that is 
a legitimate concern, the end result is that district court judges are burdened with an 
unrealistic task of construing claims from the intrinsic evidence based on what a person 
skilled in the art would understand from the claim terms, even though the judges are not 
skilled in the art. See Conner & Wasleff, supra note 46 at 882. 
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contradict the claim . . . or other parts of the patent language.” 52  
The court went on to define extrinsic evidence as “evidence which 
is external to the patent and file history, such as expert testimony, 
inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and 
articles.”53  Since dictionaries were considered extrinsic evidence, 
dictionary definitions could not “contradict any definition found in 
or ascertained by reading the patent documents.”54 
The doctrine of defining a claim “by implication” was further 
developed in Bell Atlantic.55  Relying on the analytic framework of 
Vitronics, the Federal Circuit started with the claims, and then 
moved on to the specification followed by the prosecution 
history.56  The court noted that the specification may clearly define 
a claim term without an explicit statement of definition.57  For 
instance, the “written description of the preferred embodiments 
‘can provide guidance as to the meaning of the claims, thereby 
dictating the manner in which the claims are to be construed, even 
if the guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format.’” 58  
Stated differently, the written description “may define claim terms 
by implication such that the meaning may be found in or 
ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.”59  Hence, 
“when a patentee uses a claim throughout the entire patent 
specification, in a manner consistent with only a single meaning, 
he has defined that term by implication.”60 
 
 52 Id. at 1584. 
 53 Id.  In a footnote, the Vitronics court noted that technical treatises and dictionaries 
are special extrinsic evidence, which judges are “free to consult” at any time in order to 
better understand the underlying technology and to construe disputed claim terms. Id. n.6. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc. et al., 
262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 56 Id. at 1267–69. 
 57 Id at 1268. 
 58 Id. (quoting Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 59 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 60 Id. at 1271.  But see Suggestion Test infra notes 158–86 and accompanying text.  
The Suggestion Test employed through the claim-based approach requires that the 
specification suggest that a claim term with multiple dictionary meanings was limited to 
the one meaning used in the embodiments.  For instance, if the patentee uses a claim 
term, throughout the entire patent specification, in a manner consistent with only a single 
meaning and without explicitly suggesting that the claim term was limited to that 
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Both, Vitronics and Bell Atlantic, have suggested that 
dictionaries and technical treatises hold a “special place” among 
extrinsic evidence and may be consulted at any time along with the 
intrinsic evidence.61  Despite the Federal Circuit’s special 
treatment of dictionaries, neither Vitronics nor Bell Atlantic has 
cited a dictionary definition or relied on a technical treatise to 
determine the meaning of the disputed claim terms. 
Interestingly, the evolution of defining a claim “by 
implication” has coincided with the court’s shifting focus from the 
specification to the claims.  As the claim term’s “ordinary 
meaning” began to have a central role in claim construction, some 
Federal Circuit judges became less dependent on the specification 
for determining the meaning of the claim.  Those judges became 
heavily dependent on dictionary definitions by employing the 
claim-based approach, while others have maintained their focus on 
the specification to determine an express or implicit definition of 
the disputed claim terms.62 
C. The Presumption of Ordinary and Accustomed Meaning and 
the Court’s Increased Reliance on Dictionaries 
The CCS Fitness decision was one of the earlier cases that 
applied the claim-based approach to claim construction.63  That 
case involved a patent directed to a stationary exercise device 
known as the elliptical trainer.64  At issue was the meaning of the 
claim term “reciprocating member.” 65  The patentee argued that 
reciprocating member includes a curved, multi-component 
structure used in the accused device, while the accused infringer 
 
meaning, the Federal Circuit would broaden the scope of that claim term to encompass 
other dictionary definitions so as to give the claim term the full breadth of its meaning.  
Consequently, the Suggestion Test is in conflict with defining a claim “by implication.” 
 61 Id. at 1267. 
 62 See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105 (2004).  The 
article suggests that the Federal Circuit panel can be categorized into three groups: 
Proceduralists (those who prefer the claim-based approach), Holistics (those who prefer 
the specification-based approach), and the Swing Judges. 
 63 CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 64 Id. at 1362–63. 
 65 Id at 1362. 
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alleged that the claim term referred only to a single-component, 
straight bar as disclosed in the patent drawings.66 
The court began its claim-based approach with the language of 
the claims.67  The court suggested that it will “indulge a ‘heavy 
presumption’ that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary 
meaning.”68  Moreover, the court noted that its “precedents show 
that dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary 
meaning.”69  To overcome this “heavy presumption” of a claim 
term’s ordinary meaning, the court suggested four ways: (1) if the 
patentee acted as his own lexicographer by clearly defining the 
disputed claim term in the specification or prosecution history, (2) 
if the patentee expressly disclaimed subject matter or described a 
particular embodiment as important to the invention, (3) if the term 
chosen by the patentee so deprives the claim of clarity, and (4) if 
the claim term is limited under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶6.70 
Turning to the facts of the case, the CCS Fitness court relied on 
a dictionary to determine the ordinary meaning of the term 
“member.”71  The term “reciprocating” was agreed by both parties 
to mean the “back and forth” movement of the “member.”72  Based 
on these definitions, the court concluded that the “reciprocating 
 
 66 Id. at 1364. 
 67 Id. at 1366. 
 68 Id. (citing Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 
989 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).  The significance of the Johnson Worldwide opinion is that it 
contributed to the claim-based approach by creating a “heavy presumption” in favor of 
the ordinary meaning of a claim term.  175 F.3d at 989.  The opinion also stands for the 
proposition that “[v]aried use of a disputed term in the written description demonstrates 
the breadth of the term rather than providing a limited definition.” Id. at 991.  But see 
Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“Where there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, 
and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a 
claim having the narrower meaning, we consider the notice function of the claim to be 
best served by adopting the narrower meaning.”).  The Athletic Alternatives case is 
another example that shows how the claim-based approach as applied in Johnson 
Worldwide is different from the specification-based approach. 
 69 CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366. (citing Rexnod Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 
1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 70 CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366–67. 
 71 Id at 1367.  The definition of “member” was a “structural unit such as a. . . beam or 
tie, or a combination of these.” Id. (citing MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNICAL TERMS 1237 (5th ed. 1994)). 
 72 CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1367. 
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member” encompasses the multi-component, curved structure used 
in the accused device.”73  The court determined that there was 
nothing in the specification or prosecution history that overcame 
the “heavy presumption” of the claim term’s ordinary meaning.74  
Specifically, the court explained that there was nothing in the 
specification that required a certain shape or a certain number of 
components, and the patentee did not disclaim subject matter nor 
describe a single-component straight bar “member” as important to 
the invention.75 
In Texas Digital, the Federal Circuit expanded on CCS’s claim-
based approach to claim construction.76  Like CCS Fitness, the 
court began its analysis with the language of the claims themselves 
because it was that “language that the patentee chose to 
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which 
the patentee regards as his invention.”77  The court noted that there 
is a “heavy presumption” that claim terms “mean what they say 
and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those 
words by persons skilled in the relevant art.”78  In search for the 
ordinary meaning of the disputed claim terms, the court relied 
heavily on dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises.79 
The Federal Circuit suggested that it had “long recognized” 
that “dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly 
useful resources to assist the court in determining the ordinary and 
customary meanings of claim terms.”80  The court praised 
dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises, and referred to them as 
“objective resources that serve as reliable sources of information 
on the established meanings that would have been attributed to the 
 
 73 Id. at 1367–69. 
 74 Id. at 1367 
 75 Id. at 1367–69 
 76 Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, ,308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 77 Id. at 1201–02 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶2) (internal quotations omitted). 
 78 Id. (citing CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366). 
 79 Id. at 1202. 
 80 Id.; But see Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of 
Language, and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 531 (2004) (noting that 
the Texas Digital court cited “five cases, supporting the notion of ‘long recognized in our 
precedent;’ yet four of the five cases cited are very recent—hardly indicative of a long 
precedent”—and the fifth case was an ex parte opinion from the Board of Appeals of the 
Patent Office.). 
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terms of the claims by those of skill in the art.” 81  The court 
explained that these “references are unbiased reflections of 
common understanding not influenced by expert testimony or 
events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant 
of the patent, not colored by the motives of the parties, and not 
inspired by litigation.”82 
While Vitronics regarded all the intrinsic evidence as the “most 
significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed 
claim language,”83 the Texas Digital court regarded dictionaries, 
encyclopedias and treatises as the “most meaningful sources of 
information to aid judges in better understanding both the 
technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art.”84  
The court further noted that “it is entirely proper for both trial and 
appellate judges to consult these materials at any stage of a 
litigation, regardless of whether they have been offered by a party 
in evidence or not.”85  Due to the heightened significance of these 
resource materials, the court emphasized that “categorizing them 
as ‘extrinsic evidence’ or even a ‘special form of extrinsic 
evidence’ is misplaced and does not inform the analysis.”86 
Finally, the court cautioned that consulting the specification or 
prosecution history before discerning the ordinary and customary 
meanings, “invites a violation of our precedent counseling against 
importing limitations into the claims.”87  Hence, by examining 
resource materials first, “the full breadth of the limitations intended 
by the inventor will be more accurately determined and improper 
 
 81 Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203. But see Conner & Wasleff, supra note 46 at 886 
(suggesting that any expectation that reference materials available to a court will be 
unbiased by litigation is unrealistic because there is a “selection bias that is at least as real 
as the bias of a testifying advocate, but perhaps less obvious.”). 
 82 Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203. 
 83 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 84 Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203. 
 85 Id.; But see Br. Of The American Bar Association As Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party at 10–11, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-
1269, 03-1286) (requesting that the court would rely on dictionaries only when made part 
of the record and parties were given the opportunity to address, challenge, or rebut that 
material). 
 86 Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203. 
 87 Id. at 1204. 
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importation of unintended limitations from the written description 
into the claims will be more easily avoided.”88 
This opinion evinces the Federal Circuit’s increasing 
dependence on dictionaries for claim construction.  In order to 
avoid reading limitations into the claims, a common criticism of 
the specification-based approach, the Texas Digital court 
disfavored the use of the specification and prosecution history in 
claim construction.  However, by discounting the value of the 
intrinsic record in claim interpretation, the court has failed to 
account for the context by which the term was used in the 
specification and the prosecution history.  As explained earlier, 
such context provides the patentee’s expression and intent on what 
he meant in his claims.89 
D. Overcoming the “Heavy Presumption” of a Claim Term’s 
Ordinary Meaning 
There is a “heavy presumption” that a claim term carries its 
ordinary and customary meaning.90  This section explores the four 
ways that the CCS Fitness court outlined for overcoming this 
“heavy presumption.” 
1. Patentee Acted As His Own Lexicographer 
One way to overcome the “heavy presumption” that a claim 
term carries its ordinary and customary meaning is if the “patentee 
acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of 
the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution 
history.”91  The definition must be made with “reasonable clarity, 
deliberateness, and precision.”92 
Expressly defining a disputed claim term in the specification 
was addressed in Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc.93  The 
patent-in-suit was related to encapsulated electron-luminescent 
 
 88 Id. at 1205. 
 89 See supra notes 18–41 and accompanying text. 
 90 CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 91 Id. at 1366. 
 92 Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 93 Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 256 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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phosphor particles used in illuminating watch faces and other 
instrument panels.94  At issue was the meaning of the claim term 
“oxide coating” that encapsulated the phosphor particles.95  Since 
the specification expressly defined the “oxide coating,”96 the court 
adopted that definition for its claim interpretation.97  However, 
because the parties disputed the interpretation of that definition, the 
court relied on dictionaries to support its understanding of the 
disputed claim term.98  The court emphasized that it is free to 
consult the dictionary “so long as the dictionary definition does not 
contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of 
the patent document.”99 
While this rule seems straightforward, Federal Circuit judges, 
employing the claim-based approach, are not always comfortable 
in using the specification as the primary source for construing 
disputed claim terms.  For instance, in Merck & Co. v. Teva 
Pharms. USA, Inc., the majority decision disregarded the 
patentee’s express definition of a claim phrase in the specification 
in favor of a dictionary definition.100  The patent-in-suit was 
directed to a method of treating and preventing osteoporosis 
through the administration of a chemical compound.101  Even 
though the patentee included the entire claim phrase in the 
specification, enclosed it with quotation marks, and 
unambiguously defined its meaning, the majority opinion 
abstracted the claim term out of its context, and instead, adopted its 
ordinary dictionary meaning.102 
 
 94 Id. at 1300. 
 95 Id. 
 96 The term “oxide coating” was defined as a “material made up primarily of metallic 
ions and oxygen, but which may contain minor amounts of other elements and 
compounds originating in the precursor materials or phosphor particles.” 
 97 Id. at 1303–04. 
 98 Id. at 1304. 
 99 Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584, n.6 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 100 Merck v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed.. Cir. 2005) (construing 
the claim phrase “about 70 mg of alendronate monosodium triydrate, on an alendronic 
acid basis.”) 
 101 Id. at 1366–67. 
 102 Id. at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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This prompted the dissent to accuse the majority for “paying 
only lip service to the often-cited, but rarely followed 
lexicographer rule.”103  The dissent emphasized that because the 
majority failed to honor patentee’s express definition, the majority 
decision effectively rewrote the specification.104  In essence, the 
majority’s claim construction resulted in importing limitations 
from the dictionary into the claims, wholly aside from what the 
patentee has chosen.105  While the goal of the claim-based 
approach is to avoid importing limitations into the claims, the 
Merck case demonstrates that liberal dictionary use can run afoul 
of this objective. 
2. Patentee Disclaimed Subject Matter 
When a patentee describes what a claim term means, he acts as 
a lexicographer, and when he describes what a claim term does not 
mean, he disclaims that subject matter.106  Unlike the lexicographer 
rule, disclaimer of subject matter can result from express or 
implied statements made in the specification or the prosecution 
history.107  For instance, in Scimed, the court noted that the 
patentee distinguished the dual lumen catheters by highlighting its 
disadvantages in comparison to the coaxial lumen configuration.108  
Accordingly, the court held that the dual lumen configuration was 
disclaimed in the specification and the patentee could not broaden 
the claims to encompass that configuration.109 
 
 103 Id. at 1377. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Joseph Yang et al., Navigating The Federal Circuit’s Markman Jurisprudence, 795 
PLI/Pat 733, 758–59 (2004). 
 107 Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 384  F.3d 1333, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(emphasizing that clear disavowal of subject matter does not have to be express, but can 
be implied from the written description); see Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the patentee 
criticized and disclaimed a particular feature in the specification, thereby limiting the 
claim scope); see Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 
956–57 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that an inventor disclaimed a particular feature during 
prosecution, thereby modifying the term’s ordinary meaning). 
 108 Scimed, 242 F.3d at 1342–43; see supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text. 
 109 Id. 
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One example where the patentee disclaimed subject matter in 
the prosecution history is illustrated in Omega Eng., Inc. v. Raytek 
Corp.110  The court explained that the doctrine of prosecution 
disclaimer precludes the “patentees from recapturing through claim 
interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.”111  
The rationale behind the doctrine is that it “promotes the public 
notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s 
reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.”112  To 
constitute a disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope, the 
prosecution statements must not be too vague or ambiguous; 
rather, it must be effected with “reasonable clarity and 
deliberateness.”113  Hence, for prosecution disclaimer to attach, 
“the alleged disavowing actions or statements made during 
prosecution [must] be both clear and unmistakable.”114  Turning to 
the facts of the case, the court determined that the patentee made a 
clear and unmistakable prosecution disclaimer, thereby limiting the 
scope of the disputed claim term.115 
Another example where the patentee disclaimed subject matter 
in the prosecution history is provided in Springs Window Fashions 
LP v. Novo Indus., L.P.116  Highlighting the public notice function 
of a patent and its prosecution history, the court emphasized that 
“[a] patentee may not state during prosecution that the claims do 
not cover a particular device and then change position and later sue 
a party who makes that same device for infringement.”117  If the 
court adopts the patentee’s position, it “would undercut the public 
reliance on a statement that was in the public record and upon 
which reasonable competitors formed their business strategies.”118  
The Federal Circuit noted that if the patentee disclaimed coverage 
 
 110 Omega Eng., Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 111 Id. at 1323. 
 112 Id. at 1324. 
 113 Id. at 1325 (citing Northern Telecom. Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 
1294–95 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 114 Id. at 1325–26. 
 115 Id. at 1226. 
 116 Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 994–96 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 117 Id. at 995. 
 118 Id. (citing Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 957 
(Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
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of the claimed invention by mistake, he “should have amended the 
file to reflect the error, as the applicant is the party in the best 
position to do so.”119  Since the patentee did not retract any 
statements made during prosecution, the court narrowed the claim 
scope to exclude the disclaimed subject matter.120 
3. Claim Lacks Clarity 
Another way to overcome the “heavy presumption” that a 
claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning is if the 
term “chosen by the patentee so deprive[s] the claim of clarity that 
there is no means by which the scope of the claim may be 
ascertained from the language used.”121  When such circumstances 
occur, reference to other intrinsic evidence, or in some cases, to 
extrinsic evidence is proper.122  If the specification and prosecution 
history sheds light to the meaning of the “unclear” claim term, then 
referring to extrinsic evidence is not permitted.123 
By way of example, in CCS, the accused infringer argued that 
the disputed claim term “reciprocating member” had no ordinary 
and customary meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art.124  To 
support its argument, the accused infringer presented expert 
testimony to establish that the disputed claim term lacks clear 
meaning.125  The court rejected the use of expert testimony, and 
noted that the ordinary meaning of the claim term can be resolved 
by referring to the intrinsic evidence and dictionary.126  
 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id.  For more on disclaimers, see Nagendra Setty & David S. Kerven, From 
Dictionaries To Disclaimers: Following The Federal Circuit From Texas To Disneyland, 
795 PLI/Pat 427 (2004). 
 121 Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 122 Id. (citing J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1568 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997), North Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1993), Comark Communications., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) and Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 123 Id. 
 124 CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1365–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 1368–69. 
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Accordingly, the accused infringer failed to overcome the “heavy 
presumption.”127 
In Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., the accused infringer 
also presented expert testimony to clarify the meaning of the claim 
term “pharmaceutically effective amount.”128  The court 
determined that the intrinsic evidence did not clarify the meaning 
of the disputed claim term, and therefore, relied on extrinsic 
evidence.129  Based on that evidence, the court held that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim term to mean 
an amount sufficient to provide a patient with 2.5 to 15mg/day.130 
4. Claim Construction Limited Under 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶6 
The final method that the Federal Circuit has suggested in 
overcoming the “heavy presumption” is if the patentee drafted the 
claim pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.131  The patent statute 
provides that: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed 
as a means or step for performing a specified function 
without the recital of structure, material or acts in support 
thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the 
corresponding structure, material or acts described in the 
specification and equivalents thereof.132 
Technically, this statute does not overcome the presumption; 
rather, it prevents the Federal Circuit from employing the claim-
based approach because the statute mandates the use of the 
specification in interpreting a claim element.133  The statute allows 
a patent applicant to claim an invention using functional language 
instead of structural language.134  A court interpreting this 
functional claim language must ascertain the corresponding 
 
 127 Id. at 1367. 
 128 Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 713–15 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 129 Id. at 716–718. 
 130 Id. at 718. 
 131 CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1367. 
 132 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
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structure from the written description rather than rely on the 
ordinary meaning of the claim term.135 
E. Linguistic Analysis Of Claims 
One of the key features of the claim-based approach is the 
linguistic analysis of claims.  Federal Circuit judges that employ 
the claim-based approach spend a considerable amount of their 
opinion on the claim language used.136  This linguistic analysis 
focuses more on the English language used and less on the claimed 
invention.137  In most cases, the alleged infringer seeks to alter the 
language of the claim term to what was disclosed in the 
specification or argued during patent prosecution.138  However, in 
a claim-based approach, it is the language of the claims themselves 
that control.139 
Application of the linguistic analysis to claim construction is 
illustrated in Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp.140  At 
issue was the meaning of the claim term “discharge rate” that 
appeared twice in the claim.141  Relying on the specification, the 
accused infringer asserted that the first occurrence of the disputed 
claim term should carry a different meaning from the second 
occurrence.142  The Federal Circuit rejected that argument and 
noted that the term “a discharge rate” in the first occurrence refers 
to the same rate as the term “the discharge rate” in the second 
occurrence.143  The court explained that such interpretation “avoids 
any lack of antecedent basis problem for the [second] occurrence 
of ‘the discharge rate.’”144 
 
 135 See Mirco Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 136 Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1306–09 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 831–32 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 140 Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 141 Id. at 1354–55. 
 142 Id. at 1355–57. 
 143 Id. at 1356. 
 144 Id. at 1356–57. The court suggested that both occurrences refer to “the rate (in units 
of weight per unit of time) that material is discharged from the common hopper to the 
material processing machine.” Id. at 1356.  The court also explained that this was not a 
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Similarly, in Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, 
Inc., the ordinary meaning of the disputed claim term conflicted 
with what was disclosed in the specification.145  The claim recites a 
range “only within a zone extending between latitudes 30 degrees 
[to] 45 degrees.”146  Meanwhile, the preferred embodiment 
disclosed a range between 0 degrees to 45 degrees.147  The patentee 
claimed less than what was initially disclosed in the specification 
because he had to narrow his claim to overcome the prior art.148  
Analyzing the language of the claims, the Federal Circuit 
explained that “the terms ‘only’ and ‘extending between’ 
unambiguously limit claim 1 to . . . a zone stretching exclusively in 
the space separating the latitudes 30 degrees and 45 degrees.”149  
The court emphasized that the “unambiguous language of the 
amended claim controls over any contradictory language in the 
written description.”150  This is true even if such claim construction 
would exclude the preferred and only embodiment disclosed in the 
specification.151 
Because the linguistic approach focuses on the language of the 
claims themselves, even inconsistent statements made during 
patent prosecution were disregarded by the Federal Circuit over the 
plain language of the claims.152  In Storage Technology Corp. v. 
Cisco Systems, Inc., the disputed claim terms were “caching policy 
 
situation where the patentee acted as his own lexicographer to warrant circumvention of 
the claim term’s ordinary meaning. Id. 
 145 Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1304–07 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
 146 Id. at 1306. 
 147 Id. at 1306–09. 
 148 See id. at 1308. 
 149 Id. at 1307. 
 150 Id. at 1308. 
 151 Id.  This is a case where the patentee’s disclaimer of subject matter is reflected in the 
ordinary meaning of the claim term.  Although prosecution disclaimer is used to rebut the 
“heavy presumption” that a claim term carries it ordinary meaning, the Elekta court did 
not address this issue because the amended claim term was narrowly drafted and not 
susceptible to a broader ordinary meaning.  See also supra notes 110–20 and 
accompanying text (illustrating how prosecution disclaimers can limit the scope of 
disputed claim terms). 
 152 Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 832 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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identification information” and “network policy”153  The accused 
infringer argued that the meaning of the claim was narrowed 
during prosecution.154  Specifically, the patentees stated that the 
network policy and the policy identification information are both 
cached.155  While the court acknowledged that this statement 
appears to limit the claim scope, it suggested that “it cannot do so 
absent some claim language referring to the caching of the instance 
of network policy.”156  Hence, the court concluded that an 
applicant’s erroneous or “inaccurate statement cannot override the 
claim language itself, which controls the bounds of the claim.”157 
F. The Rise Of The Suggestion Test In Claim Construction 
Ever since the claim-based approach has surfaced as an 
alternate method to claim construction, the Federal Circuit has 
increasingly applied a “Suggestion Test” to justify broad 
interpretation of disputed claim terms.158  The Suggestion Test is 
premised on the assumption that if a patentee intended to narrow a 
claim term with multiple dictionary definitions, he would have 
specifically suggested that in the specification.159  This assumption 
has created an undue burden on accused infringers because they 
are required to prove a patentee’s intent to deviate from a claim 
term’s multiple meanings even if the patentee has only used one 
meaning consistently throughout the patent.160 
Although the United States patent system requires patent 
applicants to claim what the invention is, as opposed to what it is 
 
 153 Id. at 830–31.  In computers, a cache is a “small fast memory holding recently 
accessed data, designed to speed up subsequent access to the same data.” The Free On-
Line Dictionary Of Computing, at http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/ 
foldoc.cgi?query=cache (last modified June 25, 1997). 
 154 Storage Tech Corp. 329 F.3d. at 830. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 832. 
 157 Id.  But see supra prosecution disclaimer notes 110–20 and accompanying text. 
 158 Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 134–48 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Teleflex, 
Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Sunrace 
Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 159 See Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“there is nothing in the record to suggest that ‘activating’ means other than what its 
dictionary definition would suggest”). 
 160 See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327–1328. 
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not, the court’s rationale behind the Suggestion Test suggests 
otherwise.  The court’s analysis focuses more on whether any of a 
claim term’s multiple dictionary definitions were excluded or 
disclaimed, rather than on whether the patentee used that claim 
term in the specification to connote more than one meaning.161  
Consequently, if a patent applicant uses a claim term in a manner 
consistent with only a single meaning, and without explicitly 
suggesting that the claim term was limited to that meaning, the 
Federal Circuit would broaden the scope to include other 
dictionary meanings.162  This indicates that the court’s Suggestion 
Test to claim construction mandates a central form of definition 
that is in conflict with our patent system’s peripheral form.163 
Even when the specification touts an advantage of the 
invention consistent with only one meaning to the disputed claim 
term, the Federal Circuit would refuse to narrow that claim term’s 
ordinary meaning.164  Typically, the court’s justification is based 
on the fact that the written description does not suggest the 
 
 161 Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  Although it 
appears that the Suggestion Test is similar to the disclaimer doctrine, it is different in 
many respects.  First, the disclaimer doctrine analyzes statements made in the 
specification or prosecution history, while the Suggestion Test states in the abstract that 
there are no statements made in the specification or prosecution history.  Second, the 
disclaimer doctrine is used to narrow the scope of the disputed claim term, while the 
Suggestion Test is used to broaden the scope of that claim term.  Third, and more 
importantly, the disclaimer doctrine has a lower mens rea requirement that the Suggestion 
Test.  An accused infringer may prove disclaimer through statements made by mistake; 
however, to satisfy the Suggestion Test, the accused infringer must prove that the 
patentee intended to deviate from a claim term’s multiple meanings. 
 162 See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327–28.  As emphasized earlier, the Suggestion Test is in 
conflict with defining a claim “by implication.” See supra notes 42–62 and 
accompanying text. 
 163 “Central definition involves the drafting of a narrow claim setting forth a typical 
embodiment coupled with broad interpretation by the courts to include all equivalent 
constructions.  Peripheral definition involves marking out the periphery . . . area covered 
by the claim and holding as infringements only such constructions as lie within that 
area.” Id.  See also Ex Parte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1609–1610 (Bd.Pat.App & 
Interf. 1993) (noting that the method of claiming has shifted from the central definition to 
the peripheral definition); Martin J. Adelman et al., Cases And Materials on Patent Law, 
634–642 (American Casebook Series 1998). 
 164 Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
But see Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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invention must be used only in a manner that achieves the recited 
advantage.165  Likewise, if the specification did not suggest that the 
patent limits the claims to the disclosed embodiments, the court 
would refuse to narrow the ordinary meaning of a claim term 
described in the context of these embodiments.166  Consequently, 
the Federal Circuit would broaden the scope of a claim term unless 
the patentee explicitly suggested in the specification, and not in the 
context of the embodiments, that any of the claim term’s multiple 
dictionary definitions were either excluded or disclaimed.167 
The controversial nature of the Suggestion Test is best 
illustrated in Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.168  The 
patent was directed to a device that allows attachment of a shift 
cable to an automatic transmission vehicle.169  At issue was the 
meaning of the claim term “clip.”170  The court noted that the 
specification described only one embodiment of “clip” as having a 
“single pair of legs.” 171  Nevertheless, the court concluded that the 
term “clip” is not limited to “single pair of legs.”172  Instead of 
determining whether the patentee used the term “clip” in the 
specification to connote more than one meaning, the court 
determined that there was nothing in the specification that 
suggested the claim term was limited to the disclosed 
 
 165 Northrop, 325 F.3d at 1355 (holding that a recited advantage of the invention 
consistent with only one meaning of the disputed claim term was one of several 
objectives, and the specification did “not suggest that the invention must always be used 
in a manner that achieves that objective.”); Brookhill-Wilk., 334 F.3d at 1301 (“The 
objective described is merely one of several objectives that can be achieved through the 
use of the invention; the written description does not suggest that the invention must be 
used only in a manner to attain that objective.”). 
 166 Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327–28 (“an accused infringer cannot overcome the ‘heavy 
presumption’ that a claim term takes on its ordinary meaning simply by pointing to the 
preferred embodiment or other structures or steps disclosed in the specification or 
prosecution history.”); Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“while it is clear that the patentee was primarily focused on an 
embodiment of his invention using a cam, nothing in the patent limits the claims to that 
embodiment.”) 
 167 See Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1371. 
 168 Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327–28. 
 169 Id. at 1318. 
 170 Id. at 1327–28. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 1328. 
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embodiment.173  Accordingly, the Teleflex court expanded the 
meaning of “clip” beyond what was disclosed in the specification. 
Similarly, in Sunrace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 
the court applied the Suggestion Test to broaden the scope of the 
disputed claim term.174  The parties disputed the meaning of the 
term “shift actuator,” a component used in a bicycle gear-shifting 
system.175  The court determined that the ordinary meaning of 
“shift actuator” is a “mechanism that controls the changing of 
gears.”176  Based on a number of statements made in the 
specification, the accused infringer argued that the “shift actuator” 
must be limited to a device containing a cam structure.177  One 
statement in the specification described the cam member as the 
“heart” of the shift actuator.178  Even with such a clear and 
unambiguous statement, the court concluded that “nothing in the 
written description indicates that the invention is exclusively 
directed toward cams or suggests that systems not employing cams 
are outside the scope of the invention.179 
Another case that employed the Suggestion Test is Northrop 
Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp.180  At issue was the meaning of the 
term “bus interface unit.”181  The ordinary meaning of that term 
was determined to be a “unit for interfacing with a serial data 
bus.”182  The patentee conceived that the invention “would be used 
principally, if not exclusively, in a ‘command/response’ 
environment.”183  Despite the fact that the specification referred 
repeatedly to advantages of the invention in the context of a 
 
 173 Id. 
 174 Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. Ltd. V. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 1302. 
 177 Id. at 1304. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 1305; but see Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 
242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“when the preferred embodiment is described as 
the invention itself, the claims are not entitled to a broader scope than that embodiment”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 180 Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 1355. 
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“command/response” environment, the court refused to limit the 
scope of the disputed claim term.184  The court explained that 
nothing in the specification “suggests that the invention must 
always be used in a manner that achieves that objective.”185  Once 
again the court improperly expanded the scope of the claim term 
even when the patentee used the term in the specification 
consistent with only one meaning.186 
G. Inherent Problems Associated With Specification-Based And 
Claim-Based Approaches 
Opponents of the specification-based approach have criticized 
this approach for importing extraneous limitations from the written 
description into the claims.187  They contend that there is no “need” 
to use these limitations in interpreting the claims.188  They 
exaggerate that “[i]f we once begin to include elements not 
mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim . . ., we should 
never know where to stop.”189  They do, however, correctly point 
out that “[i]f everything in the specification were required to be 
read into the claims, or if structural claims were to be limited to 
devices operated precisely as a specification-described 
embodiment is operated, there would be no need for claims.”190  
Also, there would be no need, “regardless of the prior art, [to] 
claim more broadly than that embodiment.”191  Likewise, there 
would be no need for the patent applicant to conclude his written 
description with “claims particularly pointing out and distinctly 
 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id.; but see Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“where there are several common meanings for a claim term, the patent 
disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper 
meanings.”) 
 187 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (explaining that “extraneous” limitation means a “limitation read into a claim 
from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by 
particular words or phrases in the claim.”) 
 188 Id. 
 189 Johnson Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 190 See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp. et al., 299 F.3d 1313, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
 191 Id. 
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claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.”192  As a result, opponents to the specification-based 
approach prefer to focus solely on the language of the claims.  
Their claim construction inquiry “begins and ends in all cases with 
the actual words of the claim.”193 
Like the specification-based approach, the claim-based 
approach is not free of criticism.  Proponents of the claim-based 
approach are often accused of ignoring the purpose or object that 
the patent seeks to accomplish.194  Courts employing the claim-
based approach have made a “fortress out of the dictionary,”195 
converting their extrinsic nature into “technical terms of art having 
legal . . . significance.”196  These courts always rely on dictionaries 
to determine the “ordinary and customary meaning” of a disputed 
claim term.197  However, their reliance on dictionaries for 
increased clarity of claim terms “results from a misplaced faith in 
the efficacy of that process.  The result is that more words are 
added, with the outcome being only the substitution of one 
uncertainty for another.”198  This problem is compounded when 
 
 192 Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112). 
 193 Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); see Intellectual Property Dev., Inc. v. UA Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, 
Inc., 336 F.3d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In construing claims, the analytical focus 
must begin and remain centered on the language of the claims themselves, for it is that 
language that the patentee chose to use to ‘particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] 
the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.’”). 
 194 See Michael S. Conner & John A Wasleff, Where Do We Go From Here? A Critical 
Examination Of Existing Claim Construction Doctrine, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
Soc’y 878, 879 (2004). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“Courts must exercise caution lest dictionary definitions, usually the least controversial 
source of extrinsic evidence, be converted into technical terms of art having legal, not 
linguistic, significance.  The best source for understanding a technical term is the 
specification from which it arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history.”) 
 197 Id. 
 198 Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, The Indefiniteness of Language, 
and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 533 (2004) (internal quotations 
omitted).  See Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (unnecessarily relying on a dictionary to construe the claim term “or”). 
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courts rely on more than one dictionary to define the meaning of 
the disputed claim term.199 
Proponents of the claim-based approach characterize 
dictionaries as “unbiased reflections of common understanding not 
influenced by expert testimony . . ., not colored by the motives of 
the parties, and not inspired by litigation.”200  However, they fail to 
recognize that “[t]here is a selection bias that is at least as real as 
the bias of a testifying advocate, but perhaps less obvious.”201  
Parties supplying the dictionary definitions are “usually quite 
capable of finding references to furnish at least a colorable 
argument supporting their respective positions.”202  Therefore, any 
expectation that the dictionary definition is unbiased or uninspired 
by litigation is “unrealistic.”203 
One of the shortcomings of the claim-based approach is that it 
has no standard for determining the resource materials used in 
construing claims.  The Federal Circuit did not indicate the type of 
resource materials it prefers, and the pertinent date for selecting 
these materials.  Their “decisions have not always been consistent 
as to whether the pertinent date is the filing date of the application 
or the issue date of the patent.”204  Some cases have suggested that 
the pertinent date is the issue date of the patent.205  This is 
problematic because these sources were not available to the patent 
applicant for access at the time he or she has filed the patent 
application.206  Even if the court identified the version and edition 
 
 199 Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(relying on three dictionaries to determine the meaning of the disputed term). 
 200 Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 201 Michael S. Conner & John A Wasleff, Where Do We Go From Here? A Critical 
Examination Of Existing Claim Construction Doctrine, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 878, 886 (2004). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378 
n.2 (Fed. Cir 2002). 
 205 Id. (noting that dictionary definitions must be as of the date the patents issued).  See 
also Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (rejecting references that were dated well after the issue date of the patent). 
 206 Jennifer R. Johnson, Out Of Context: Texas Digital, The Indefiniteness Of Language, 
And The Search For Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 536 (2004) (suggesting that the 
“group of dictionaries that the court considers proper may well include sources that the 
applicant not only did not have access to but also those he could not have had access to 
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of a universal dictionary that it prefers, it would be difficult for 
competitors to locate this resource material, which could date back 
a decade or two.207 
In the name of efficiency and predictability, many 
commentators champion the use of the claim-based approach.208  
They suggest that this formalistic approach promotes the public 
notice function because it “emphasizes the meanings of claims 
within the four corners of a patent.”209  In reality, the claim-based 
approach is not predictable because competitors cannot determine 
in advance what reference dictionary the court will rely on in 
interpreting the claims.  Since the court has endorsed the 
consultation of dictionaries “at any stage of a litigation, regardless 
of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or 
not,”210 even the parties to the litigation do not get an advance 
notice and an opportunity to address, challenge, or rebut the court’s 
dictionary definition.211  Therefore, it seems unlikely that the 
claim-based approach promotes the public notice function. 
Ideally, courts should construe claims consistent with the 
method used by the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).  
However, when courts employ the claim-based approach, their 
claim construction differs.  Under PTO practice, “the meaning of 
the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the 
[written] description.”212  PTO examiners rarely depend on 
dictionaries for interpreting claim terms; rather, they “frequently 
 
because they may have become ‘publicly available’ between the time he submitted his 
application and its issue.”). 
 207 Daniel S. Matthews, Baffled: Phillips v. AWH Corp. And The Reexamination Of 
Dictionary Use In Patent Claim Interpretation, 6 N.C.J.L. & Tech. 153, 162 (2004). 
 208 Ruoyu Roy Wang, Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward A More 
Formalistic Patent Claim Construction Model, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 153, 167–173 
(2004); Anthony R. Zeuli & Rachel Clark Hughey, Avoiding Patent Claim Construction 
Errors: Determining The Ordinary And Customary Meaning Before Reading The Written 
Description, 51 Fed. Law. 29, 29–30 (June 2004). 
 209 See Ruoyu Roy Wang, supra note 208 at 169–71. 
 210 Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 211 See Br. Of The American Bar Association As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 10–11; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 
03-1286). 
 212 Br. For The United States As Amicus Curiae at 10–12; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 
F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(d)(1)). 
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rely on their own understanding” of the terms and the “context” by 
which these terms are used in the specification.213  Consequently, 
PTO examiners interpret claims in the broadest reasonable sense 
and not the broadest sense possible.214  When courts apply the 
claim-based approach, they run the risk that their claim 
interpretation is “at odds with the PTO’s interpretation in issuing 
the patent.”215 
The advantage of the claim-based approach is the ease by 
which courts can rely on dictionaries to construe claims.216  
However, this ease encourages superficial claim construction with 
inadequate technical understanding of the invention.  Judges focus 
more on the “ordinary meaning” of claims and less on how a 
person skilled in the art would understand the claims.217  This is 
true because judges attribute more evidentiary weight to 
dictionaries and devalue the role of expert testimony.218  As a 
result, more and more decisions employing the claim-based 
approach have imported “extraneous limitations” from the 
dictionary into the claims.219 
II. THE ROLE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
“Extrinsic evidence is that evidence which is external to the 
patent and file history, such as expert testimony, inventor 
testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and articles.”220  It is 
at the lower end of the hierarchy of evidence that can be used to 
 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See Ruoyu Roy Wang, supra note 208 at 168–69. 
 217 Michael S. Conner & John A. Wasleff, Where Do We Go From Here? A Critical 
Examination Of Existing Claim Construction Doctrine, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
Soc’y 878, 879–80 (2004). 
 218 Id. 
 219 Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 220 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  Note 
that the Texas Digital court emphasized that “categorizing [dictionaries] as ‘extrinsic 
evidence’ or even a ‘special form of extrinsic evidence’ is misplaced and does not inform 
the analysis.” Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
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construe claims.221  Generally speaking, extrinsic evidence cannot 
change the meaning of a claim term discernible from the intrinsic 
record.222  Extrinsic evidence “may be used only to help the court 
come to the proper understanding of the claims; it may not be used 
to vary or contradict the claim language.”223 
In most cases, an analysis of the intrinsic record, i.e., the 
claims, the specification, and the prosecution history, will suffice 
in resolving any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.224  In these 
circumstances, extrinsic evidence “is entitled to no weight” and 
reliance on such evidence is improper.225  However, if after 
considering all the intrinsic evidence there is still some ambiguity, 
a trial court may rely on extrinsic evidence to determine the 
meaning of the disputed claim term.226 “Such instances will rarely, 
if ever, occur.”227 
Even when the patent documents are unambiguous, “it is 
entirely appropriate, perhaps even preferable, for a court to consult 
trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction 
it is tending to from the patent file is not inconsistent with clearly 
expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in the 
pertinent technical field.”228  Indeed, using extrinsic evidence to 
guide the court in understanding the technology ensures the 
prospects of proper claim construction that is not “at variance with 
the understanding of one skilled in the art.”229 
 
 221 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582–84. 
 222 Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 223 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582–84. 
 224 Id.at 1583. (“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will 
resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.”) 
 225 Id. at 1584. 
 226 Id.; Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A] 
trial court is quite correct in hearing and relying on expert testimony on an ultimate claim 
construction question in cases in which the intrinsic evidence . . .[] does not answer the 
question.”) 
 227 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. 
 228 Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
see also Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also 
Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 229 Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1309; see Br. Of The American Bar Association As 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6–8, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286) (advocating that a court should “‘always’ 
consult secondary sources for education on the technology.”) 
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It is also appropriate to consider inventor testimony “to provide 
background information, including explanation of the problems 
that existed at the time the invention was made and the inventor’s 
solution to these problems.”230  Although the subjective intent of 
the inventor has “no probative weight in determining the scope of a 
claim, this statement does not disqualify the inventor as a witness, 
or overrule the large body of precedent that recognizes the value of 
the inventor’s testimony.”231  The inventor is a competent witness 
who is experienced in the field of the invention.232  Inventor 
testimony may be used to explain the invention, but it may not be 
used to vary or contradict the scope of the claims.233 
These guidelines for using extrinsic evidence allow 
competitors to rely on “the public record, apply the established 
rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s 
claimed invention and, thus, design around the claimed 
invention.”234  The guidelines prevent the patentee from altering 
the scope of the claims at trial to read on an accused device.235  
Moreover, the guidelines preclude accused infringers from varying 
or contradicting the ordinary meaning of a disputed claim term.236 
While some extrinsic evidence, such as expert or inventor 
testimony, may be biased reflections of common understanding, 
colored by motives of the parties, and inspired by litigation,237 
admissibility of such evidence is safeguarded through a trial 
court’s “gate keeping” duties.238  Trial judges are likely to admit 
 
 230 Voice Techs.. Group., Inc. v. VMC Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 231 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id.; but see Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372 (Fed Cir. 2000) 
(noting that a trial judge should not consider inventor testimony when trying to determine 
what invention was disclosed in the specification.). 
 234 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. at 1582–83. 
 237 Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(implying that dictionaries are better than expert testimony because they are unbiased 
sources of information). 
 238 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) 
(discussing a trial judges role under Fed. R. Evid. 702 in admitting expert testimony 
based on scientific knowledge); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 
(1999) (extending the gate keeping requirement from scientific to all expert testimony). 
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expert or inventor testimony only when it is relevant and 
reliable.239  If the district court distrusts this testimony, the court 
has the authority to appoint an expert or a technical advisor.240  
This provides the trial court the ability to ascertain the meaning of 
a disputed claim term consistently with the understanding of one 
skilled in the art.  Despite the valuable educational role of extrinsic 
evidence, some courts are confused on whether to consider the 
evidence when the patent documents are unambiguous.241 
III. OVERLAPPING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION WITH VALIDITY 
ANALYSIS 
At the district court level, claim construction occurs during a 
Markman hearing, while a validity analysis occurs during the trial.  
At the Federal Circuit level, typically both issues are addressed 
separately in the opinion.242  However, occasionally some Federal 
Circuit judges commingle their validity analysis with claim 
construction.243  They require that “[c]laims amenable to more than 
one construction should, when it is reasonably possible to do so, be 
construed to preserve their validity.”244  However, this does not 
mean that courts are permitted to redraft claims to maintain their 
 
 239 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
 240 See TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(allowing trial judges to appoint technical advisors); Fed. R. Evid. 706 (allowing trial 
judges to appoint expert witnesses). 
 241 See Br. Of The American Bar Association As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 6–8, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 03-
1286) (suggesting that lower courts are confused about the proper role of extrinsic 
evidence). 
 242 Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Mas-
Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Key Pharms. v. 
Herconn Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709 (1998). 
 243 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (using expert testimony and extrinsic evidence to determine “a 
pharmaceutically effective amount” that would maintain the validity of the claim phrase); 
Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(importing the range 0.015–0.040 from the specification into the claims to maintain the 
validity of the claim term “relatively small”). 
 244 Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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validity.245  “Where the only claim construction that is consistent 
with the claim’s language and the written description renders the 
claim invalid, then the axiom does not apply and the claim is 
simply invalid.”246  Hence, after employing all the tools to claim 
construction, if the claim is ambiguous or rendered invalid under 
§§ 102, 103, or 112, the Federal Circuit will not “save” the claim 
from invalidity by reading extraneous limitations into it.247 
Safeguarding the validity of claims during claim construction 
invites a patent holder to present exceedingly broad interpretation 
of claims to read on an accused device,248 or in the alternative, 
present narrow interpretation of claims to avoid the prior art.249  In 
the event that a broad interpretation renders the claims invalid, the 
court would narrow the scope of the claims to maintain the validity 
of the patent.250  This encourages patentees to abuse the legal 
system because, in many instances, they seek to alter the scope of 
the claims beyond what they could have secured from the PTO.251 
The consequences of claiming broadly in the PTO should 
equally apply in the federal courts.  If the patentee presents broad 
claim construction that, for instance, reads on the prior art or is 
unsupported by the written description, he should be penalized by 
invalidating that claim.252  This hard lined approach discourages 
 
 245 Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(emphasizing that when proper construction of claims is clear and unambiguous, the 
questions of priority and validity must be addressed separately from claim construction). 
 246 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 24 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotations omitted) (invalidating broadly construed claims because they read on 
the prior art); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 
1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that claims are not “to be ‘saved’ from 
invalidity by reading extraneous limitations into them”). 
 247 See Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 911; Karsten, 242 F.3d at 1384; E.I. du Pont, 849 
F.2d at 1434. 
 248 Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 249 See Karsten, 242 F.3d at 1384. 
 250 See id.  This is true only when the claims are amenable to more than one 
construction.  However, if the claims are amenable to only one possible construction that 
would render the claims invalid, courts will not rewrite the claims to sustain their 
validity. 
 251 Apple Computer, 234 F.3d at 24; E.I. du Pont, 849 F.2d at 1434. 
 252 It is not unusual to penalize a patentee during litigation.  In fact, Congress has 
enacted a statute that penalizes patentees whose claim was invalidated during litigation 
by denying them recovery of legal fees. See 35 U.S.C. § 288. 
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patentees from broadening the scope of their claims during 
litigation and promotes judicial efficiency in construing disputed 
claim terms. Patentees will no longer seek to confuse the court 
with overly broad interpretation of claims in fear of getting their 
claims invalidated.  This approach should only apply to patentee’s 
proposed claim construction, and should not be applied 
dogmatically by the accused infringer to invalid the patent.253 
Protecting the validity of claims during claim construction, not 
only encourages a patentee from presenting very broad 
interpretation, but also violates the public notice function of 
patents and conflicts with the right to a jury trial on invalidity.254  It 
violates the public notice function because some information may 
not be available to the public until well into the discovery phase of 
the case.255  Consequently, it would be unfair to hold the public on 
notice of this information.  Furthermore, taking validity into 
account does conflict with the right to a jury trial on invalidity.256  
Because invalidity often requires resolution of factual disputes, it is 
the prerogative of the jury and not the judge to resolve these 
issues.257  Allowing a trial judge to address these issues during 
claim construction would impair the patentee’s right to a jury 
trial.258  Hence, considering validity during claim construction is 
improper and courts should analyze them separately. 
 
 253 See Michael S. Conner & John A Wasleff, Where Do We Go From Here? A Critical 
Examination Of Existing Claim Construction Doctrine, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 878, 907 (2004) (noting that “an approach that dogmatically insists that the claim 
be construed to the full reach of a word definition, and then immediately invalidates the 
patent when it reads on prior art, is [ ] destructive of the presumption of validity . . .” of 
the claims). 
 254 See Br. Of The American Bar Association As Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 14–16, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 
03-1286). 
 255 Id. (noting that “secret” prior art under §§ 102(e) and (g) is not available to the public 
to determine the meaning of the claims). 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
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IV. PHILLIPS: AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE TENSION BETWEEN 
SPECIFICATION-BASED AND CLAIM-BASED APPROACHES 
Because the specification-based approach conflicts with the 
claim-based approach, tension between these two methods of claim 
construction has slowly brewed over the past decade.  Finally, in 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., these two methods of claim construction 
have come face-to-face in a challenge that would determine their 
vitality.259 
A. The Trial Court And Federal Circuit Panel Decisions 
In Phillips, the patent was directed to vandalism-resistant 
building panels used in prison construction.260  At issue was the 
meaning of the claim phrase “means disposed inside the shell for 
increasing its load bearing capacity comprising steel baffles . . .”261  
The patentee, Phillips, argued that the phrase is not a means-plus-
function claim because the word “baffle” recites sufficient 
structure.262  To broaden the scope of the claim, the patentee 
suggested that the term “baffle” must be construed in accordance 
with its ordinary and customary meaning as a “means for 
obstructing, impeding, or checking the flow of something.”263  The 
accused infringer, AWH Corp., maintained that the specification 
limited the scope of “baffle” to a configuration “positioned at an 
acute or obtuse angle to wall faces.”264  Specifically, the accused 
infringer contended that the written description did not describe a 
baffle configuration oriented at 90 degrees to the wall faces, and 
therefore, the accused panels fall outside the scope of the claims.265 
The district court erroneously interpreted the disputed claim 
phrase as a means-plus-function limitation, and relied on the 
structures disclosed in the specification for its claim 
 
 259 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
dis’d in part, and rem’d, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 260 Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1209. 
 261 Id. at 1210 (emphasis added). 
 262 Id. at 1211. 
 263 Id. at 1210–11. 
 264 Id. at 1211. 
 265 Id. 
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construction.266  Based on the undisputed facts of the case, the 
lower court granted the accused infringer’s motion for summary 
judgment of non-infringement, and the patentee timely appealed to 
the Federal Circuit.267 
While the majority and the dissenting Federal Circuit judges 
agreed that the disputed claim phrase was not a means-plus-
function limitation, they disagreed on the approach for construing 
the claim term “baffle.”268  The majority, while citing cases that 
applied the claim-based approach,269 mimicked its specification-
based analysis to that of Scimed and Bell Atlantic.270  The majority 
explained that “[i]nspection of the patent shows that baffles angled 
at other than 90 degrees is the only embodiment disclosed in the 
patent; it is the invention.”271  Furthermore, the majority noted that 
“[i]t is impossible to derive anything else from the 
specification.”272  Because the majority’s claim construction 
achieved the same result to that if section 112, paragraph 6 was 
invoked, the majority affirmed the lower court’s claim construction 
order.273 
Dissenting Judge Dyk accused the majority for “attempt[ing] to 
work a major and unfortunate change in our recent claim 
construction jurisprudence” because they effectively limited the 
scope of the claim to the preferred embodiment.274  The judge 
 
 266 Id. at 1210. 
 267 Id. at 1210–11. 
 268 Id. at 1212–1219. 
 269 Id. at 1213 (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Comark Communications Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 270 Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001); Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc. et 
al., 262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 271 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 272 Id. at 1213.  Note that the majority’s approach to claim construction is similar to Bell 
Atlantic.  While the majority opinion suggested that the patentee has used the claim term 
throughout the patent specification consistent with only a single meaning, that is a baffle 
configuration positioned at an acute or obtuse angle to wall faces, the majority fell short 
in concluding that the term was defined “by implication.” 
 273 Id. at 1214. 
 274 Id. at 1216.  Apparently, Judge Dyk assumed that there is only one line of Federal 
Circuit jurisprudence on claim construction.  As explained in this article, there are at least 
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emphasized that the Federal Circuit has “expressly rejected the 
contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the 
claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that 
embodiment.”275  Employing the Suggestion Test to claim 
construction, the dissenting judge noted that “ ‘the specification 
here does not suggest that [baffles oriented at angles other than 90 
degrees] are an essential component of the invention . . . .’”276  
Moreover, the judge maintained that the specification touts impact 
resistance as one of several objectives, and therefore, the claim 
should not be limited to achieve that objective.277  Consequently, 
the judge interpreted the term “baffle” consistent with its 
dictionary definition.278 
Dissatisfied with the panel decision, the patentee filed a 
combined petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.279  In 
view of the rising conflict between the specification-based 
approach and the claim-based approach, the Federal Circuit 
granted the petition to rehear the appeal en banc.280  The Federal 
Circuit requested the parties to address seven issues and invited 
amicus curiae briefings from bar associations, trade or industry 
associations, government entities, and other interested parties.281  
After hearing the oral arguments, the Federal Circuit issued its 
highly anticipated decision on July 12, 2005.282 
B. The En Banc Decision 
Nine out of the twelve Federal Circuit judges joined the entire 
opinion in favoring the specification-based approach over the 
 
two approaches to claim construction: the specification-based approach and the claim-
based approach. 
 275 Id. at 1217 (quoting Liebel-Flarheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)). 
 276 Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1217. 
 277 Id. at 1217–18. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. at 1382–84. 
 282 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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claim-based approach.283  Judge Bryson wrote the majority opinion 
for the en banc court.284  Despite the basic agreement for using the 
specification-based approach, Judges Lourie and Newman would 
have applied the facts differently from the majority.285  Only 
Judges Mayer and Newman dissented for the majority’s continued 
persistence to give no deference for trial court’s claim construction 
rulings.286 
The seven issues under en banc review are analyzed below: 
Question 1: “Is the public notice function of patent claims 
better served by referencing primarily to technical and general 
purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a claim term 
or by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in the 
specification? If both sources are to be consulted, in what order?” 
287 
The court began its analysis by emphasizing that (1) claim 
terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning”; 
(2) “the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the 
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in 
the art”; and (3) “the person skilled in the art is deemed to read the 
claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which 
the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, 
including the specification.” 288  The court cited numerous cases for 
the proposition that the “best source” for claim construction is the 
“patent specification.” 289  The court further noted that the PTO 
ascertains claim scope by giving the claim its broadest reasonable 
construction ‘in light of the specification as it would be interpreted 
by one of ordinary skill in the art.”290  Consequently, the Phillips 
court concluded that it is “entirely appropriate for a court, when 
 
 283 Id. at 1308–09.  Ironically, Judge Dyk, who dissented in the 3 panel decision, also 
joined the majority opinion in favoring the specification-based approach to claim 
construction.. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. at 1328–30 (Lourie, J. & Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 286 Id. at 1330–35 (Mayer, J. & Newman, J., dissenting). 
 287 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382–84 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 288 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. 
 289 Id. at 1315. 
 290 Id. at 1316–17. 
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conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written 
description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims.” 291 
Although extrinsic evidence, including dictionaries and learned 
treatises, are useful in educating the judge on the technology, the 
court considered such evidence as “less reliable.”292  The court 
explained that extrinsic evidence (1) “by definition is not part of 
the patent”; (2) “may not reflect the understanding of a skilled 
artisan in the field of the patent”; (3) “can suffer from bias”, such 
as in the case of expert report and testimony; and (4) may be an 
“unbounded universe” having “some marginal relevance”.293  As a 
result, undue reliance on dictionaries, divorced from the intrinsic 
record, would undermine the public notice function of patent 
claims. 294 
In sum, the court attributed greater evidentiary weight to the 
specification than dictionaries, but encouraged district courts to use 
both types of evidence so that the public notice function of patent 
claims would be best served.  “The sequence of steps used by the 
judge in consulting various sources is not important; what matters 
is for the court to attach the appropriate weight to be assigned to 
those sources. . .” 295 
Question 2: “If dictionaries should serve as the primary source 
for claim interpretation, should the specification limit the full 
scope of claim language (as defined by the dictionaries) only when 
the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when the 
specification reflects a clear disclaimer of claim scope? If so, what 
language in the specification will satisfy those conditions? What 
use should be made of general as opposed to technical 
dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if 
there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same term? If the 
dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a 
term, is it appropriate to look to the specification to determine 
what definition or definitions should apply?” 296 
 
 291 Id. at 1317. 
 292 Id. at 1318. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 1324. 
 296 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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The Phillips court criticized the claim-based approach, adopted 
in Texas Digital, because the approach “placed too much reliance 
on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries . . . and too little on 
intrinsic sources, in particular the specification and prosecution 
history.”297  It allowed courts to consult the specification only after 
determining a claim term’s ordinary meaning based on a dictionary 
definition.298  Typically, the specification was used to (1) exclude 
one of the meanings determined from the dictionary; (2) determine 
if the patentee has disavowed any claim scope; or (3) determine if 
the patentee acted as his or her own lexicographer. 299 
The court emphasized that the claim-based approach 
“improperly restricts the role of the specification in claim 
construction” and allows an “unduly expansive” interpretation of 
claims beyond what the inventor secured from the PTO.300  The 
court noted that both general and technical dictionaries provide 
“expansive array of definitions,” but there is no assurance that 
these dictionaries used the term in the same manner as the patentee 
have in the specification.301  If a district court begins its analysis 
with a “broad dictionary definition in every case and fails to fully 
appreciate how the specification implicitly limits that definition, 
the error will systematically cause the construction of the claim to 
be unduly expansive.”302  Accordingly, the Phillips court explained 
that this “risk of systematic overbreadth is greatly reduced if the 
court instead focuses at the outset on how the patentee used the 
claim term in the claims, specification, and prosecution history, 
rather than starting with a broad definition and whittling it 
down.”303 
Question 3: “If the primary source for claim construction 
should be the specification, what use should be made of 
dictionaries? Should the range of the ordinary meaning of claim 
language be limited to the scope of the invention disclosed in the 
 
 297 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. at 1321. 
 301 Id.. 
 302 Id. 
 303 Id. 
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specification, for example, when only a single embodiment is 
disclosed and no other indications of breadth are disclosed?” 304 
The Phillips court attributed a secondary role to dictionaries, 
outweighed by the specification and the prosecution history.  It 
rejected the claim-based approach, but failed to adequately address 
the underlying concern of Texas Digita—to avoid importing 
limitations from the specification into the claims.305  “[T]here is 
sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the 
specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the 
specification.”306  The court explained that this line “can be 
discerned with reasonable certainty and predictability if the court’s 
focus remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in 
the art would understand the claim terms.”307 
Unfortunately, the court’s explanation on this key issue 
provides neither “clarity” nor “predictability.”  If we are to focus 
on how a person skilled in the art would understand the claim 
terms, we would probably need extrinsic evidence, such as expert 
testimony.  Ironically, expert testimony has a subordinate role in 
claim construction because it is readily viewed as biased 
opinion.308  So, how can we rely on subordinate evidence to 
determine the role of the specification, the primary evidence for 
claim construction? 
The Phillips en banc court also warned against limiting claims 
to specific embodiments in the specification, even if the patent 
described only a single embodiment.309  The court maintained that 
reading the specification, with the understanding that its specific 
purpose is to teach, enable, and provide the best mode for 
practicing the invention, would in most instances clarify whether 
the patentee merely provided some examples or intended to limit 
the claims to the embodiments.310  The court acknowledged that in 
 
 304 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 305 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 306 Id. (citing Comark Comms., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 307 Id. at 1323. 
 308 Id. at 1318. 
 309 Id. at 1323 (citing Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc. v. International Trade Comm’n, 383 
F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 310 Id. at 1323. 
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some instances “it will be hard to determine whether a person of 
skill in the art would understand the embodiments to define the 
outer limits of the claim term or merely to be exemplary in 
nature.”311  Nevertheless, the court refrained from devising a 
“magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction” 
and preferred to address this issue in the context of a specific 
patent.312 
This decision leaves the door open for inconsistent judicial 
claim interpretation, as illustrated by how Judges Lourie and 
Newman construed the term “baffle” different from the 
majority.313  The majority emphasized that the specification does 
not require all the advantages of the claim term to be 
accomplished; rather, any one advantage would suffice.314  
Consequently, the term “baffle” should not be limited to acute or 
obtuse angles, but can also be oriented at a right angle.315  
Disagreeing with the majority’s claim construction, Judges Lourie 
and Newman pointed out that the specification does not contain 
any disclosures of baffles with right angles, and so must be limited 
to acute or obtuse angles.316  This demonstrates that even when the 
Federal Circuit agrees on using a unified claim construction 
approach, the outcome of the case is still dependent on the judge’s 
personal interpretation of claims. 
Question 4: “Instead of viewing the claim construction 
methodologies in the majority and dissent of the now-vacated 
panel decision as alternative, conflicting approaches, should the 
two approaches be treated as complementary methodologies such 
that there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a patentee must 
satisfy both limiting methodologies in order to establish the claim 
coverage it seeks?” 317 
The Phillips court did not consider the two approaches 
complementary; instead, it favored the specification-based 
 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. at 1324. 
 313 Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J. & Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 314 Id. at 1326–27. 
 315 Id. at 1327. 
 316 Id. at 1329–30 (Lourie, J. & Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 317 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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approach over the claim-based approach.318  Like Vitronics, the 
court permitted the use of dictionaries and treatises, only to the 
extent that they do not “contradict claim meaning that is 
unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.” 319  It did not 
provide a “rigid algorithm for claim construction.”320  Instead, the 
court encouraged district court judges to consider all evidence, in 
any sequence, and attribute more evidentiary weight to intrinsic 
evidence.321 
Question 5: “When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly 
construed for the sole purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 
U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112?” 322 
The Federal Circuit continued its controversial practice of 
narrowly construing claims to preserve their validity.323  While the 
court did not endorse a validity analysis as a regular component of 
claim construction, it limited such analysis only when “the court 
concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim 
construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.”324  Since the court 
considered the term “baffle” as unambiguous, it refused to apply 
the “doctrine of construing claims to preserve their validity.”325 
Although the Phillips court permitted the commingling of 
validity analysis with claim construction, it misapplied the 
doctrine.326  The doctrine requires that “[c]laims amenable to more 
than one construction should, when it is reasonably possible to do 
so, be construed to preserve their validity.”327  However, if after 
employing all the tools to claim construction, the claim is 
ambiguous or rendered invalid, the Federal Circuit should not 
“save” the claim from invalidity by reading extraneous limitations 
 
 318 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1325–27 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 319 Id. at 1324; see Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs. Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 320 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. 
 321 Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)). 
 322 Id. at 1382. 
 323 Id. at 1327–28. 
 324 Id. at 1327 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)). 
 325 Id. at 1327–28. 
 326 See id. 
 327 Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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into it.328  Hence, the court should invoke the doctrine when a 
claim term is susceptible to more than one meaning, and not if the 
term is ambiguous, as the Phillips court has suggested.329  
Moreover, if the claim term is ambiguous, the court should refrain 
from “saving” the term from invalidity, rather than indulge in an 
effort to preserve its validity. 
Question 6: “What role should prosecution history and expert 
testimony by one of ordinary skill in the art play in determining the 
meaning of the disputed claim terms?”330 
The prosecution history is part of the intrinsic record; therefore, 
it should be considered in determining the meaning of a disputed 
claim term, and must be attributed more evidentiary weight than 
any extrinsic evidence.331  It contains a “complete record of the 
proceeding before the PTO,” including any explanations made by 
the patentee to obtain the patent.332  However, “it often lacks the 
clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim 
construction purposes” because it only “represents an ongoing 
negotiation” between the patent applicant and the PTO.333  
Nevertheless, the prosecution history can be useful in claim 
construction by indicating “how the inventor understood the 
invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the 
course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it 
would otherwise be.”334 
Extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony is 
considered “less significant” and “less reliable” than the intrinsic 
evidence.335  This is because expert testimony is “generated at the 
time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from 
bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence.”336  However, it can 
have a constructive role in claim construction by (1) educating the 
court on the relevant technology; (2) explaining how the invention 
 
 328 See Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 911; Karsten, 242 F.3d at 1384. 
 329 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 330 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382–84 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 331 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. 
 332 Id. (citing Autogiro Co of America v. U.S., 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). 
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Id. at 1317–19. 
 336 Id. at 1318. 
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works; (3) ensuring the court’s understanding of the technology is 
consistent with that of a person of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) 
establishing a particular term’s special meaning in the pertinent 
field.337  Hence, expert testimony is useful, but must be considered 
in the context of and attributed less evidentiary weight than the 
intrinsic record.338 
Question 7: “Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 . . . (1996), 
and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, 
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed.Cir.1998), is it appropriate for this court 
to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim 
construction rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what 
circumstances, and to what extent?”339 
The Phillips court decided not to change the de novo review of 
a trial court’s claim construction ruling.340  While many were 
hoping that the Federal Circuit would give some deference to a 
trial court’s claim construction, the en banc court declined to 
address this issue in the present case.341  This decision drew 
criticism from Judges Mayer and Newman.342  They were 
disappointed that the majority did not say anything new, “but 
merely restate what has become the practice over the last ten years 
– that [the Federal Circuit] will decide cases according to whatever 
mode or method results in the outcome [it] desire[s].”343 Using 
“dictionaries first, dictionaries second, never dictionaries, etc., etc, 
etc.” are among the many alternative modes that the Federal 
Circuit has employed.344  The dissenting judges emphasized that 
“there can be no workable standards by which this court will 
interpret claims so long as we are blind to the factual component of 
the task.”345  Since the Federal Circuit has maintained status quo, 
this debate on the standard of review will continue unresolved. 
 
 337 Id. 1318–19. 
 338 Id. at 1317. 
 339 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 340 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 341 Id. at 1328. 
 342 See id. at 1330–35 (Mayer, J. & Newman, J., dissenting). 
 343 Id. at 1330. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. at 1331. 
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CONCLUSION 
Embarking on a quest to provide a unified claim construction 
approach, the Phillips en banc case could undoubtedly have had a 
greater impact on the legal and business professions.  This Note 
presented the ideological underpinnings of the two approaches to 
claim construction, and examined their advantages and 
disadvantages.  The Phillips court may have relieved the tension 
between the two approaches by choosing the specification-based 
approach over the claim-based approach, but it failed to adequately 
address the disadvantage of using the specification-based 
approach.  The court did not explain how one can distinguish 
between “reading limitations from the specification into the 
claim”346 and “interpreting patent claims [in light] of the 
specification.”347  Accordingly, the role of the specification 
remains obscure.  While it is unlikely that this case will be the last 
word on claim construction, it is hoped that this Note will 
contribute some constructive ideas to the court’s future 
examination of its claim construction methodology. 
 
 
 
 346 Id. at 1323. 
 347 Id. at 1329. 
